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NGOs and Non-electoral Politics

Build Participatory Democracy and the Autonomous Public Sphere

by Francis Loh

am cover A political controversy surrounding the proposed construction of the Penang Outer Ring Road (PORR) Project made the headlines in early December 2002. The controversy resulted in the suspension of two elected Penang State Legislative Assembly Persons (SLA) from their own party. Their suspension reminds us that when the chips are down, the Barisan Nasional (BN) always prioritise their party interests ahead of those of the rakyat whom they claim to represent. How else does one explain the decision of the BN leaders, including those from the MCA, to punish the two Penang MCA SLAs for, apparently, going against the BN party whip ?

Malaysians who have been struggling for political reform and change but who have become disillusioned with the opposition, especially PAS, that appears fixated with realizing an Islamic state, should take special note. They should not argue themselves into a corner and end up tacitly supporting the BN instead.

By analyzing the PORR controversy, I wish to highlight the existence of two realms of politics in Malaysia, the formal and the non-formal. Although these two realms often converge, they are in fact different. Malaysians who are disillusioned with electoralism and the political parties, including the opposition parties, might want to engage in the non-formal realm instead. There is much need for consolidating this sphere if we are keen on ushering in participatory rather than simply procedural democracy. This article is submitted as a response to the debate on our current political options that has been conducted in the previous two issues of the Aliran Monthly.

Let us first discuss the PORR controversy before investigating the two different realms of politics.

The PORR Project

porr Thanks to the PORR controversy, Tan Cheng Liang (SLA for Jawi) and Lim Boo Chang (SLA for Datuk Keramat), two relatively unknown Penang MCA representatives have recently become nation-wide personalities. Issues surrounding their failure to vote against the DAP motion in the Penang Assembly on 21 Nov, the investigation by the MCA Disciplinary Board into their abstention, and their subsequent suspension from the MCA indefinitely, dominated domestic politics in early December.

There have been arguments and counter-arguments by their supporters and detractors whether the party whip was in effect when the voting was conducted; of the other SLAs who were missing when the vote was taken; of brewing tensions between the MCA and Gerakan as well as between the MCA and UMNO; of the severity as well as the laxity of the punishment meted out so far; and now of “new information” available which has prodded UMNO to take the matter to the BN Supreme Council. It is not unlikely that the MCA will now be pressured by the BN Council to expel Tan and Lim.

Significantly, there has been little attention given in all this public discussion on the merits and demerits of the PORR Project itself.

Opposition to PORR

Yet it is obvious that many Penangites are opposed to the PORR Project, not least of all because the Penang State government had not duly consulted those whose homes were going to be affected prior to approval of the Project. Although no detailed Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) as required by law has been conducted, the deputy chief minister has proclaimed that there would henceforth be no further realignment of the proposed highway. No doubt there will be serious impact on the environment, and the quality of life of Penangites will be affected.

But there is also popular concern that the Penang government is trying to solve Penang’s transport problems by simply adding a new ring road here, an additional expressway there, and even a third link connecting the island to the peninsula. There is no evidence that it is developing an “integrated transport system” wherein a more comprehensive public transport system (including perhaps a light rail transit system) is given due consideration. Finally, there is amazement that the RM1.02 billion Project has been awarded to Peninsular Metroworks Sdn Bhd a company with next to no experience in highway building, raising questions of cronyism.

tan It is because of such concerns and anxieties that Danny Law, the DAP SLA for Batu Lanchang, with the support of two opposition Assembly members, introduced the motion to postpone the PORR Project pending completion of the long delayed RM400 million Jelutong Expressway. Only after its completion, Law had argued, could it be determined whether there was real need for this controversial highway. It was because of this growing disconcertment between the Penang Government and the Penangites, according to Tan Cheng Liang, that she abstained from voting against the DAP motion. After all, the DAP motion was simply to postpone the launch of the Project.

However, it does not appear that the merit of Tan’s argument, even less the objections of Penangites, were ever seriously taken into consideration during the MCA Disciplinary Board’s deliberations. For a while, it seemed that the Board was concerned whether the BN party whip was in effect when the vote was taken. With prime minister Dr Mahathir reminding the MCA that it had a standing obligation to the coalition, otherwise Malaysia’s democracy would be threatened, the writing on the wall was clear. Put another way, the coalition’s interests are deemed to always precede the interests of individual parties while the possibility of the coalition’s interests contradicting the people’s interests is not considered at all.

In Dr Mahathir’s spin on the notion of democracy, the coalition, by virtue of its being elected into power, already represents the people. It follows that protests and objections are always the purview of the opposition. In identifying Wong Kam Hoong, Penang’s MCA chief, to be responsible for instigating these anti-PORR protests, Gerakan president Lim Keng Yaik was alleging that Wong and the Penang MCA were associating themselves with the opposition.

Worse, Lim was perhaps suggesting that had it not been for Wong and the MCA, there would not have been any protest and controversy. The Gerakan president, who does not reside on the island, insults Penangites, considerable numbers of whom are opposed to the Project for reasons mentioned above. Some also smell a rat! They did not need to be instigated by the MCA nor even by the opposition parties.

The Formal Realm Of Procedural Democracy

The PORR issue highlights the existence of the formal and the non-formal realms of politics in Malaysia. The formal realm is the one involving the executive and the bureaucracy, the judiciary as well as the legislative assemblies and parliament, the electoral process and the political parties. Procedural democracy characterizes this formal sector. This realm is overwhelmingly dominated by the BN coalition. The non-formal sector is that realm of politics wherein ordinary people, sometimes organized as NGOs or informal groupings, express themselves peacefully. It is not readily associated with political parties or with elections.

From the PORR case, it is clear that the BN’s domination of the legislative allows it to ride roughshod over the people’s wishes. And should members of the BN coalition “threaten to undermine” the interests of the ruling coalition, these members of the coalition, too, can be sacrificed. Such a situation does not augur well for the rakyat who very often turn to formal politics to resolve their problems and predicament. There is also the current concern that PAS, the leading opposition party, is nowadays more interested in pushing for the realization of an Islamic state, rather than in representing the interests of the rakyat, Muslim and non-Muslim. In view of such apprehensions about the opposition parties, there is a danger that concerned Malaysians might begin to withdraw from politics, or rally behind the BN by default.

In fact, there is little possibility of PAS’ Islamic state coming to pass in the immediate future. For in response to the improved performance of PAS in the 1999 general election, the BN government, which still controls a two-thirds majority of seats in Parliament, has quickly amended the Election Laws and the Election Offences Act to arrest the opposition’s electoral advance (see Aliran Monthly vol 22 no 3).

Additionally, the Elections Commission (SPR), which is nowadays beholden to the government, has proposed new electoral constituency boundaries, that, when passed by Parliament, will enhance the chances of the ruling coalition in the next election (see Aliran Monthly vol 22 no 8). In short, electoral democracy and the formal political realm generally - especially when we consider the coercive laws like the ISA, OSA, UUCA and Societies Act as well - are clearly under the initiative of the BN.

The Non-Formal Realm Of Participatory Democracy

By comparison, there exists more scope for manoeuvring in the non-formal realm of politics.

Since the 1980s, a small but articulate group of the middle-class, often organized into NGOs, have promoted a new discourse and practice of participatory democracy. By the latter is meant not only the institutional checks and balances associated with free and fair elections and procedural democracy. It further refers to the creation of an autonomous public sphere that allows for alternative views of development and democratic participation to be aired.

For instance, these NGOs, which are usually multi-ethnic in orientation, consciously avoid racial-baiting which dominates the formal electoral process. Women groups like AWAM, Sisters in Islam, the Women’s Aid Organisation and the Women’s Crisis Centre are important components of this realm of politics and have struggled against the patriarchal structures that characterize the formal realm of politics and insisted that women deserve equal rights. In the mid-1990s, they were particularly successful in working with other women’s groups engaged in formal electoral politics to successfully lobby for the Domestic Violence Act and to amend various other laws which discriminated against women.

Human rights groups like Suaram, Hakam and Aliran have also struggled against the ISA and other coercive laws by conducting seminars, petitions, legal aid and sometimes demonstrations. Environmental groups like the Environmental Protection Society Malaysia, Sahabat Alam Malaysia, Malayan Nature Society and the anti-Bakun Dam coalition have lobbied with some success to protect the environment. On several occasions environmentalists have also gone to Court.

The Estate Workers Support Committees have also been prominent in struggling for the introduction of a monthly wage scheme while other groups have protested alongside the so-called peneroka bandar (urban pioneers) threatened by developers and demanded due compensation or low-cost housing when evicted. There are the consumer groups, particularly FOMCA, CAP and ERA-Consumer who have educated the rakyat about their rights as consumers through signature campaigns, workshops and publications. Finally there are also groups like the Third World Network and JUST who have focused on issues of globalization and injustices in the international system.

Setback

Malaysian NGOs had suffered a major setback when the BN government conducted a mass crackdown on dissent in October 1987, codenamed Operation Lalang. In one fell swoop, 106 Malaysians – representatives of NGOs, unionists, opposition leaders, educationists, church social activists, and even ordinary villagers – were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Many were incarcerated in the infamous Kamunting Detention Camp without trial for two to three years. Consequently, the momentum towards “participatory democracy”, “alternative development”, “rule of law”, “accountability” and “justice” was halted in its stride. The democratic space which had been patiently claimed by the burgeoning popular movement led by the NGOs in the 1980s was usurped by the state. Politics was re-directed towards the formal realm of political parties and elections thereafter.

No doubt coercive laws and outright repression struck fear in many Malaysians. But the BN’s consolidation was also due to the rapid economic growth which occurred from the late 1980s until the economic crisis in 1997. This growth was spearheaded by deregulation of the economy and privatization of the public sector. Fed up with the waste, inefficiency and corruption associated with the public sector, a large sector of the Malaysian public, especially the middle-classes which now enjoyed unprecedented levels of consumerism, welcomed the policy shift. Anticipating opportunities for themselves, businessmen – bumiputera, local Chinese and foreigners – also welcomed privatization. The corollary to this was the emergence of developmentalism, a new political culture which valorized not only economic growth but the political stability which it necessitated, associated in the minds of most Malaysians with the BN, since the coalition had ruled the country uninterruptedly since independence in 1957.

Reformasi

reformasi However, this realm of non-formal participatory politics burst onto the Malaysian scene once again in the late 1990s. This dramatic turnaround had everything to do with the dual crises – the 1997 financial crisis and especially the “Anwar saga”, i.e. Anwar’s sacking from the cabinet, his expulsion from UMNO, and his subsequent arrest, prosecution and sentencing to jail. But the demands of Anwar’s supporters quickly moved beyond concern for Anwar’s well being to issues such as “rule of law”, “participatory democracy” and “justice for all”. The Reformasi movement also called for the repeal of coercive laws, especially the ISA, and for curbs on “corruption, cronyism and nepotism”.

Like the NGOs, the Reformasi movement was also multi-ethnic in orientation. It involved women as well as men, the young as well as the old. Indeed the issues which it upheld were the very issues that the NGOs had kept alive throughout the 1990s as developmentalism held sway and the BN consolidated its grip over the Malaysian public. It highlighted the importance of sustaining that counter-discourse of participatory democracy and the autonomous public sphere even when no impact seemed evident during the early 1990s..

NGOs In The Opposition

This counter-discourse was subsequently adopted not only by the leaders of the Reformasi movement, who re-organised themselves as a politial party, Parti Keadilan Nasional, but by the new opposition coalition, the Barisan Alternatif (BA) as well.

The spirit of the counter-discourse is evident in the BA’s joint manifesto “For a Just Malaysia” and in their “people-friendly” alternative budget, which proposed increased spending for social programs. In fact, the formation of the BA and the formulation of its joint manifesto was facilitated to some extent by the decision of several prominent NGO activists to join the opposition parties, especially Parti Keadilan and Parti Rakyat Malaysia, and to promote the democratic agenda of the BA writ large. Several former NGO leaders also contested the election under the banner of one or another of the BA parties.

The entry of these NGOs leaders into party and electoral politics was perhaps the culmination of the earlier engagement of the NGOs with the opposition parties to set up two coalition bodies, namely Gagasan and Gerak in 1998 to coordinate joint activities to protest Anwar’s mistreatment and related issues. Although there were differences and frustrations, a sense of camaraderie also emerged as a result of debating and working with one another.

NGOs Outside The Opposition

A related development was the proliferation of NGOs and other independent groups (see box next page) which also made their voices heard as the 1999 general election approached. Although it appeared that they were critical of the BN and its policies, these NGOs and new groups were also addressing their concerns to the BA, indeed, to any coalition seeking to rule the country.

Most of these groups and initiatives as mentioned in the box were not associated with the BA opposition coalition or directly concerned with the outcome of the election. Rather the emergence of these groups, alongside the Reformasi movement and the formation of the BA indicated that Malaysia was in democratic ferment. It further indicated the coming together of the formal and non-formal realms of politics.

Probably for the first time, significant numbers of the Malay middle-classes were also involved. Previously supporters of the BN-UMNO government, these Malays now considered the BN government zalim (cruel) and tak adil (unjust) and expressed their anger openly. This change in attitude and orientation was due to Anwar’s mistreatment, which for many Malay dissidents was considered to have breached “traditional“ norms and practices. They also revealed that Malays were now equally concerned with larger issues of justice and democracy. Through organizations like Abim (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, or Islamic Youth Movement Malaysia) and JIM (Jamaah Islah Malaysia or Reform Movement Malaysia), which reached down to the grassroots, lower income Malays were also drawn into this movement. UMNO no longer held the same hegemony over the Malay community.

BN Recaptures The Initiative

New Citizens' Initiatives 1998-1999
  • the “Women’s Agenda for Change,” which demanded that the laws be enforced to protect women’s rights and that these rights be furthered through new legislation;
  • the “Citizens Health Initiative,” which mobilized Malaysians from all walks of life to oppose the pending corporatisation of the general hospitals and other health services;
  • the “People are the Boss” involving Chinese youths who championed a return to the original meaning of democracy;
  • the 17-Point “Election Appeals” (Suqiu), which focused on issues of justice and democracy rather than specific Chinese issues which was endorsed by more than 2000 Chinese associations;
  • Election Watch or Pemantau organized by Budi, a new NGO, which rallied 40-odd NGOs to jointly monitor the electoral campaign and to prepare a report of its findings;
  • about 50,000 signatories of a petition co-ordinated by the Estate Workers Support Committees demanding a monthly wage scheme and better working conditions for plantation workers, several busloads of whom converged on parliament’s doorsteps to deliver the petition;
  • a coalition of NGOs, principally Indian-based, that called for an inquiry into the killing by the police of 18 Indians (including a pregnant woman) on two separate occasions, whom the police suspected were criminals;
  • an unprecedented march through the streets of Kuala Lumpur in December 1998 by a few hundred lawyers in support of a colleague who was found guilty of “contempt of court” for remarks uttered while defending Anwar Ibrahim in court;
  • environmentalists who protested the continued resettlement of Sarawak natives although the Bakun HEP project had been shelved, as well as the proposed construction of the Selangor Dam which threatened destruction of some pristine forests and required eviction of the indigenous peoples living there;
  • a mass campaign led by FOMCA and other consumer organizations to encourage parliamentarians to pass the Consumers Protection Act;
  • artistes who parodied the unfolding political events and protested against injustices in their compositions and songs, artwork and installations, performances and skits, verse and, in one instance, an entire novel; and
  • groups of ordinary Malaysians who had purchased into housing development projects which were stalled on account of the economic crisis and then protested collectively against the developers and pressured the government to look into their plight;
  • small groups of urbanites in Kuala Lumpur and Penang in particular who actively campaigned for conservation of historical buildings and the urban habitat; and finally
  • the emergence of Malaysiakini, Malaysia’s first online news daily and other independent websites.
Although the BN won the November 1999 election, nonetheless, there occurred a tremendous improvement in the fortunes of the opposition, PAS in particular. Indeed, despite the opposition’s defeat, it appeared - for a while at least - that the momentum remained with the opposition. Unlike previous opposition coalitions, for instance, the BA continued to hold together after the election.

However, by 2001, not least because of the September 11 Tragedy and George W Bush’s “war against terrorism”, the momentum was seized by the BN government again. Even prior to the Tragedy, the DAP had voiced concerns with PAS’ increasing focus on introducing Hudud laws and other Islamic practices in Terengganu. In the wake of the Tragedy, the DAP withdrew from the opposition coalition. Non-Muslims but also Muslims have also been concerned about allegations concerning PAS’ connections to the Kumpulan Miltan Malaysia (KMM), and by extension the Jemaah Islamiyya, allegedly al-Qaeda’s proxy in the Southeast Asian region.

Although there has been no evidence of such PAS connections whatsoever, nonetheless, the dramatic change in the international political climate, which has resulted in fear of political Islam, has had its knock-on effects in Malaysia. This has resulted in fear of PAS’ intentions - not helped by the fact that PAS has seemingly focused on its goal of realizing Islamic rule in Terengganu. Meanwhile, the BN has consolidated itself through a series of victories in the Sarawak state elections and other by-elections, the PBS’ return to the BN, and Mahathir’s enhanced international status as the voice of moderate Islam.

Return To Non-Formal Participatory Democracy ?

It is amidst this scenario that we want to remind ourselves of how, as in this PORR controversy, the BN government cannot be expected to prioritise the rakyat’s interests ahead of their own. At a time when we expect the BN to be more magnanimous, it chooses to ride roughshod over the protests of Penangites, and even of its own elected representatives. It is a timely reminder to Malaysians concerned with bringing about political reform that our political choices should be located within the wider context of formal and non-formal politics. Otherwise we restrict ourselves to the realm of party politics and argue ourselves into the corner of the “better the government we know than the one we don’t know”.

Unlike the political parties and their engagement in the electoral process, the focus of a particular NGO is often cause-specific. Its impact upon the political process is therefore limited and evident only over the long term. NGOs have been excellent instruments for championing specific causes, especially of those groups which have been marginalized. By definition NGOs eschew the electoral process because of the compromising stances required. In this regard they differ from the political parties, which are concerned with mobilizing different sectors of the society and aggregating their different demands so as to win elections. In the face of their limited impact, like-minded NGOs network with one another to enhance their influence. Yet even then, their impact remains limited.

By joining forces with opposition parties in 1999, the Malaysian NGOs were able to enrich those parties as well as hasten the process of political reform. This was evident in the democratic ferment which characterized the pre-and post 1999 election period. That was even more telling in the cases of the Indonesian (1998), Thai (1992) and Filipino (1985 and 2001) NGOs where, by co-operating with the opposition parties and engaging in the formal political process, they actually contributed towards regime changes.

Perhaps what is required especially now in Malaysia is to return to the realm of non-formal politics. There is a need to sharpen the counter-discourse of alternative development strategies and to consolidate the practices of participatory democracy. The autonomous public sphere outside of political parties and elections needs to be expanded. There will be occasion in the future to re-engage with the formal political realm either during future elections or on specific causes. Meanwhile networking among the NGOs must also be prioritized so that engagement with the formal political realm when it is resumed is conducted from a position of strength.

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