Parliamentary Reform Lessons from the UK and Europe By G Lim
Yet whatever democracy there is in Britain now, is a result of a long struggle for reform. The British parliament two hundred years ago would be unrecognisable to any democrat today. Voting was restricted to men who owned property above a certain value, meaning less than one in twenty adults could vote.
There was no secret ballot and the size of constituencies varied enormously. In the eighteenth century, the ‘rotten borough’ of Old Sarum, with only three houses, elected two MPs; the county of Yorkshire, with nearly a million inhabitants, elected only one MP.
The nineteenth century saw a series of Reform Acts in Britain, which slowly increased the male franchise. These changes were forced upon unwilling governments by protest movements, such as the famous Chartists, and even riots.
At the turn of the twentieth century, another movement emerged seeking votes for women. One of the movement’s leaders, Emilie Pankhurst, died after throwing herself in front of the King’s horse to bring attention to their cause.
Some women gained the vote in 1918. It was only in 1928 however – less than 75 years ago – when women finally gained equal voting rights to men, and Britain could claim to be a full democracy in today’s sense of the word.
Even then, of course, democracy only applied to the British. Millions of people around the world – in Malaya, India and other colonies – were ruled directly or indirectly from Westminster, with no democratic representation.
The point is that the struggle for democracy in Britain – like the struggle for independence in its colonies – was one of slow change brought about by the hard campaigning of ordinary people.
That being said, let us look at some of the ways in which parliament needs reform.
Government Accountability
One of the most important functions of parliament is to hold the government accountable for its actions. There are a variety of mechanisms common in parliaments around the world for doing so.
First, parliament can refuse to pass legislation put forward by the government, or can even remove the government, usually through a vote of no confidence (or impeachment in presidential systems).
Second, governments are often held accountable in parliament through select committees. These committees are made up of a small number of MPs, usually from all parties, tasked with scrutinising a particular area of government policy.
Third, almost all democratic parliaments are bicameral (meaning they have two Houses), where the Upper House acts as a check on the Lower House.
Fourth, many parliaments have other mechanisms for government accountability, such as question time, when ministers are obliged to answer questions by other MPs and ‘Opposition days’, when the Opposition get to set the debate in parliament.
Sadly, most of these measures are non-existent or poorly functioning in Malaysia. Let us consider them one by one:
A Rubber Stamp
In practice, the Malaysian parliament is a rubber stamp for the BN. Legislation is rarely properly debated – attendance in the Dewan Rakyat is appalling, and BN backbenchers are too scared to stand up, even when they disagree with government legislation.
When a government has a large majority, parliament always runs the risk of becoming devalued, simply because the government can afford to lose a few votes from its own party or allies.
It is interesting to note, however, that in the UK, where the Labour Party has a huge majority at the moment, Labour backbenchers have openly criticised government policy on a range of issues, from disability benefits to Tony Blair’s attitude towards Iraq.
Parliamentary Committees
Parliamentary committees are in woefully short supply in Malaysia, seriously hampering parliament’s ability to check government actions.
The business of government is huge these days, and it is unrealistic to expect every MP to be up to speed on all issues. It is here that parliamentary committees come in, by mandating a small group of MPs with monitoring a particular area of government policy, such as defence or social security.
Lest anyone think that select committees are powerless, two instructive tales from the UK:
In the UK, the parliamentary accounts committee, which is charged with auditing government expenditure, is routinely chaired by a member of the opposition. During the first two years of the last Labour government, this committee forced the government to change its policy a staggering 950 times.
The UK parliament also has a powerful Standards and Privileges Select Committee, again chaired by an opposition MP. This committee hears evidence of breaches of parliamentary codes of conduct and can recommend suspension of MPs, though this must be ratified by the whole House.
The Upper House
One inherent problem with parliamentary democracy is that the government is usually formed by the party which has a majority in parliament. Parliament is thus inevitably biased towards the government.
To provide an extra check on the government, most countries have an Upper House, which is elected or appointed separately from the main parliament. This Upper House generally has limited powers to modify or delay legislation, but this is often effective.
The Upper House in Malaysia – the Dewan Negara – is modelled upon the House of Lords in the UK. Whereas appointments to the House of Lords are for life, appointments to the Dewan Negara are for three years, and only two terms can be served.
The problem with the Dewan Negara is that, because it is appointed by the government, its members are no less indebted to the government than the BN backbenchers.
In 1997, Lim Kit Siang called the Dewan Negara ‘the rubber stamp of rubber stamps’ and a ‘rubbish-bin for political has-beens, rejects and deadwoods’.
Not much has changed since then.
Ironically, enough, the UK is now engaged on a long process of reform in the House of Lords, which is expected to end in an elected chamber.
If the UK can get rid of the final vestige of its feudal past, isn’t it about time we thought about reforming the Dewan Negara?
Other Mechanisms
Other mechanisms for ensuring government accountability are also lacking here in Malaysia.
Opposition days are non-existent, and opposition requests for debate are invariably turned down by the Speaker.
(In the UK, the Speaker is also frequently from the Opposition party. Needless to say, this has never happened here.)
Ministers and deputy ministers frequently make a farce of question time by absenting themselves from parliament when they should be answering questions.
In fact, attendance in the Dewan Rakyat is often appalling. On many occasions, there are not even the minimum 26 MPs present to form a quorum.
If MPs do not even turn up to parliament, it is irrelevant how good the mechanisms for government accountability are.
That being said, let us now look at the ways in which MPs are selected – the election process itself – and how this could be reformed.
First-past-the-post
Both Britain and Malaysia operate on a voting system known as ‘First-Past-the-Post’ or ‘Winner Takes All’. This means that the country is split into geographical constituencies, each of which returns one representative to parliament.
Many parliamentary reformers find this system flawed because it can lead to results unrepresentative of the ways in which people really voted (the ‘popular vote’). Here in Malaysia, for instance, the Barisan Nasional regularly captures over 80% of the parliamentary seats, even though its share of the popular vote rarely rises above 60% (see Table 1).
Table 1: Proportion of votes and parliamentary seats won by BN since 1959
This means that its parliamentary dominance is not reflective of its popular support. In the UK, too, this can be a problem. In 2001, the Labour Party won a landslide victory, with almost two-thirds of the seats on a vote of just over 40%. Whilst the misrepresentation of the First-Past-the-Post system has always benefited the BN here, it has worked both ways in Britain. In 1987, for instance, the Conservatives won 58% of the seats on 43% of the vote. In general, the First-Past-the-Post system tends to exaggerate the majority of the winning party (or coalition). Sometimes, however, governments have manipulated constituency boundaries to ensure their continued re-election. In Malaysia, constituency redelineation is carried out by the nominally independent Elections Commission. Its decisions constantly favour the government. In the last general election, the average number of voters in each constituency was around 50,000. The variation in size, however, was enormous. Hulu Rajang in Sarawak had only 16,018 registered voters, whereas Ampang Jaya in Selangor had over six times that number, with 98,527. In fact, Sarawak and Sabah – which have consistently voted strongly for the BN – have by far the smallest constituencies. Similarly, another BN stronghold, Johor, is reputed to be gaining more representation soon. These means that those areas which are BN strongholds get more MPs than those which are not. The biggest loser in the First-Past -the-Post system in Malaysia has been the DAP. This is because support for the DAP has been concentrated in the cities, which tend to have the larger constituencies. In the last election, the DAP won 5% of the seats with 12% of the popular vote. In the past, the situation has been even worse. In 1982, the DAP won almost 20% of the vote, but got only 9 out of 154 seats. The First-Past-the-Post system is doubly flawed. It has a systemic flaw, which tends to exaggerate majorities, and it is easily open to abuse by unscrupulous incumbents. So what are the alternatives? Proportional Representation A number of voting systems have been devised that attempt to produce a parliament more closely reflective of the popular vote. These systems come together under the term ‘proportional representation’, or PR. Broadly speaking, PR systems tend to work on much larger constituencies than First-Past-the- Post, which return multiple MPs. These MPs are selected proportionately according to the party’s vote. Thus, for instance, one could have a system whereby each district returns ten MPs. If one party wins 40% of the vote, it would get four MPs. If another party won 20%, it would get two MPs, and so on. Voting under PR systems is thus for a party rather than an individual. If such a system had been used in the 1999 general election, the BN would still have won, but by a considerably reduced margin. KeADILan would have picked up a couple of seats in places like Selangor and Pahang, where they performed reasonably well but won nothing. Similarly, the DAP would have won more seats in Perak and Sarawak. Conversely, the BN would have won more seats in Kelantan and Terengganu, where it won around 40% of the vote, but only one seat. PR systems are thus much fairer than First-Past-the-Post, but come with a host of problems of their own. Firstly, because they tend to encourage smaller parties, which are sidelined in First-Past-the-Post systems, they often lead to unstable coalition governments. Italy, for instance, has averaged more than one change of government per year since the Second World War. Italy is now one of the few countries moving away from PR. Connected to this is the problem of disproportionate strength that smaller parties holding the balance of power can wield in coalition arrangements. By threatening to withdraw their support from a fragile coalition, small parties can play a kingmaker role that belies their popular support. A good example of this happened recently in Israel, where the small Shas party, a member of Ariel Sharon’s coalition government, forced changes to his budget. Of course, here in Malaysia we already have a coalition government under a First-Past-the-Post system. It is thus open to speculation what effect PR might have on the BN. One likely outcome, however, would be to reduce UMNO’s dominance of the coalition, giving more strength back to the other BN components. In Switzerland, a multiethnic federation like Malaysia, proportional representation in all elected bodies is seen as the key to maintaining interethnic harmony. The second problem with PR is that it reduces the geographical link between an MP and his constituency. Instead of one MP representing Jelutong and another representing Balik Pulau, for instance, there might be five or six MPs representing Penang as a whole. The problem with this is it lessens MPs responsibility for – and interest in – local issues. PR proponents point out, however, that it also means that constituents have a choice of which MP to approach. A Chinese DAP supporter living in Balik Pulau, for instance, might find it difficult to approach his MP (from UMNO) on matters that concern him. Under a PR system, however, he would have the option of approaching one of a number of Penang MPs, at least one of whom is likely to be more amenable. Some countries, like Germany, have attempted to combine the benefits of both systems. Half the seats are elected under a First-Past -the-Post system, half under PR. The bottom line is there is no perfect system for electing MPs, but Proportional Representation is much fairer and much less easily corruptible than First-Past-the- Post. What can be done? It is time for a radical overhaul of the parliamentary system in Malaysia. Our institutions are based on centuries old British traditions, which even they are getting rid of now. Parliamentary practice is even worse – ignored, manipulated or simply paid lip service to. The problem is that we cannot realistically expect parliament to reform itself – why would those in power do anything to weaken their own grip on power? It is thus up to us as concerned citizens to push for change. Only if enough people tell parliament enough times that it needs to reform will it sit up and take notice.
Now e-mail us and tell us what you think. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Oh what a difference this might have made to one young Malaysian woman, if she had been able to put her case to a properly mandated and relatively impartial committee, instead of being lynched by a mob of government backbenchers baying for blood!