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The taming of the Dayak The PBDS saga continues
by Phillip Khoo
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In November 2002, the Sarawak National Action Party (SNAP), Sarawak’s first Dayak-based party, was de-registered by the Registrar of Societies (ROS) for alleged contravention of the Societies Act. In early December 2003, the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) was likewise de-registered. In SNAP’s case, a sizeable proportion of its leadership, aligned with the Sarawak Chief Minister, quickly set up a new party, the Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP). The SPDP was registered by the Registrar of Societies in record time – under a week – and just as quickly recognized and admitted into the BN, an indecent haste suggesting a conjunction of views between Putrajaya, then under Mahathir, and Kuching. This left a rump in SNAP to appeal against de-registration. In the context of Sarawak politics, this was a crippled rump outside the BN, needing to re-discover the lost spirit and wherewithal to function as an opposition party – which they did to a very limited degree in the recent parliamentary elections. In the PBDS’ case, the main leadership, encouraged by statements of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi (also Minister of Home Affairs), appealed against the ROS decision to de-register the party. This decision was made consequent upon a ‘show cause’ letter issued in September 2003 relating to the status of some PBDS branches, hence the status of the Triennial Delegates Conference (TDC) of July. The ‘show cause’ letter was an outcome of complaints arising from an acrimonious contest for PBDS’s top leadership positions, a contest that resulted in two Triennial Delegates Conferences (TDC), two Presidents, two Deputy Presidents and two Supreme Councils. At the time the ‘show cause’ letter was issued, the Registrar ruled that the second TDC, held by the James Masing-Sng Chee Hua faction, was illegitimate. This faction then initiated the formation of a new party, the Parti Rakyat Sarawak. Unlike the case with the SPDP, this did not receive the super fast-track treatment, suggesting a probable difference of views between the powers-that-be in Putrajaya and in Kuching. Putrajaya apparently favoured some sort of a revival of the PBDS – subsequently confirmed by the lifting of the de-registration in March 2004 – whereas Kuching apparently favoured the James Masing-Sng Chee Hua faction – subsequently indicated by the recent state cabinet re-shuffle. Fractious and ineffective as they may have been, Dayaks, their leaders and politicians cannot be ignored; they have, however, to be kept in line – a process that has been going on in one form or another since the Stephen Kalong Ningkan affair and even prior to that in the consolidation of Brooke rule. From SNAP to PBDS The PBDS was formed in September 1983, after a large Dayak exodus from SNAP, allegedly to better articulate and promote Dayak aspirations and hopes. Since its formation, PBDS has been in the Federal Barisan Nasional but was, for a while, in opposition at the state level where it represented a distinctive voice; since re-joining the state BN, it has, in public, been content to echo whatever positions taken by the state leadership, effectively the Chief Minister. Nevertheless, when PBDS was de-registered and looked set to follow SNAP’s fate, it appeared that Dayaks had lost an explicit Dayak voice in an ethnicised national and state political system at a time when the relative socio-economic, indeed demographic, standing of Dayaks has been slipping. The SPDP has yet to manifest an independent, or distinctive, voice. Indeed, it would hardly be missed if all of its leaders were to join the main BN party, the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB). The two other parties in the Sarawak BN, Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) and Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), have Dayak representation, but are largely regarded as non-Dayak parties. Once SUPP had a significant Dayak presence and projected itself as a multi-ethnic left-wing party; it has long since become an essentially Chinese party, and a party of business. PBB, in origin a merger of an Iban party with a Malay party, is popularly seen as a Malay-Melanau dominated party but over the past thirty years has been more of a ‘supremo’-dominated party, the past 23 years by the current Chief Minister Taib Mahmud, who is also the Minister for Resource Planning (covering land, environment and natural resources, hence authority over the most important state agencies), the head of the State Planning Authority and, with the recent state cabinet reshuffle, the state Minister of Finance. The current opposition parties don’t have much of a presence in local state politics. In what remains a largely parochial political situation, they either suffer from being viewed as offshoots of peninsula-based parties or from the – well-founded – fear that voting opposition would mean the end of ‘projects’ and largesse, the popular understanding of ‘the politics of development’. Helpless calm Despite SNAP’s de-registration and the continuing uncertain state of affairs in the PBDS, there has been an eerie calm, excitement being mostly confined to the politically involved and to the urban areas. Perhaps this sentiment is indicative of a sense of helplessness and powerlessness in the rural areas where over 70 per cent of Dayaks live. It is also indicative of how those parties had become broadly irrelevant to their day-to-day lives just when land rights and land issues are increasingly prominent and when the equity of access to opportunities for socio-economic advancement is increasingly questioned. These issues supposedly had a role in the events leading to the de-registration of, at least, the PBDS. Yet, despite the brave and heated words uttered in private, both SNAP and PBDS publicly supported the state government’s every policy and every action. Both parties were unwilling or unable to address, in public, the concerns uppermost in the minds of a majority of Dayaks. Instead, and in common with the state leadership, SNAP and PBDS leaders exhorted Dayaks to adhere to the very state policies and actions they privately questioned. Indeed, they even upbraided Dayaks who sought redress for many wrongs, particularly related to Sarawak’s last great resource – land. Forgotten passions Hard as it may be to believe now, SNAP once excited the imagination of Dayaks. When people were poorer and communications much more difficult and costly, it was the people who carried SNAP to significant electoral victories. The people provided their services and support for free, the party being too poor to offer many resources in campaigning, other than their presence, message and aspirations. So, too, PBDS once generated great passion and excitement. That was not always healthy for it led to longhouses splitting, sometimes literally and physically, as it swept along the hopes of the people, especially Iban, for the future. Then, by the sheer fact of its existence in opposition to the state BN, PBDS managed to stay certain policies and actions. Land policies already in place were shelved for fear that PBDS would be a rallying point for mass dissent. How times have changed, and the mighty fallen! At the height of SNAP’s fortunes in the 1970s, it took detention under the Internal Security Act and severe pressure to bring the party to heel, and compel it to join the BN. In the 1980s, after a stint in the state BN, PBDS was at the centre of a revolt against the state leadership that inadvertently exposed the widespread cronyism and corruption in the rape of Sarawak’s timber resources. Yet, by the time of the de-registrations of SNAP and PBDS, there was much thunder signifying little. Conflict over crumbs In each case, the immediate cause of de-registration was fratricidal conflict and, no matter the noble phrases. It was primarily a fight over the crumbs of political leadership and office within the BN. It was a conflict mainly of the urban elite with echoes amongst the rural elite, hardly arresting to the mass imagination. SNAP’s immediate problem was apparently the tawdry desire of its aging president, James Wong, to pass the reins to his son who couldn’t claim pre-eminence over others in a competition for leadership. With PBDS, it was a drawn-out contest for succession to its President, Leo Moggie, who finally stepped down, evidently because he was pushed. Still, the PBDS debacle has provoked considerable hand-wringing and much gossip and finger-pointing amongst the politically involved and in the urban areas. The hot topic may be vulgarly summarised as: Was it ‘attempted murder’ or ‘assisted suicide’? Both sides now There are proponents for both views. The ‘assisted suicide’ version has ‘cupidity’, ‘venality’, ‘money politics’, and ‘inflated self-regard’ writ all over it. The ‘attempted murder’ version is hinted at in public obliquely suggesting that . Only in private are divulged the details and identities of the ‘assistants’ – the usual suspects – whose goals are allegedly to ‘keep the Dayaks down’ and ‘to control the Dayaks’, and so on. Most independent observers conclude there is more than a little truth in both versions. The ‘assisted suicide’ could work only because there were quarters bent on murder. The public record of statements and actions of the principal actors lead to no other conclusion. The present slide into de-registration can be dated back to PBDS’s last contest for leadership posts in 2000. Then, Daniel Tajem contested the deputy presidency of the party against James Masing who went for broke by not contesting one of the vice-presidencies of which he was an incumbent. Daniel had recently returned from his furlough as Malaysian High Commissioner to New Zealand. His High Commissioner’s appointment was evidently to clear the way for PBDS’s return to the state BN (because even when it stood in opposition in the state, PBDS remained a member of the national BN). Upon his return, Daniel picked up the cudgels on a number of issues, particularly the amendment to Sarawak’s Land Code that had caused considerable concern in Dayak circles. James, on the other hand, had done well since PBDS’s return to the state BN. He had become a full state minister, initially placed in charge of tourism. A state cabinet reshuffle, after Abang Johari’s demotion following his successful campaign for PBB’s deputy presidency, saw James promoted to Minister of Social Development and Urbanisation. Until 2000, James was also one of PBDS’s vice-presidents. More than one to blame In 2000, much talk below the surface blamed James for not having stood up to the Land Code amendment. The amendment, while promising finally to title native customary rights (NCR) land, removed some previous provisions thought to be safeguards and introduced others that caused much concern. Although there was broad support for resolving Sarawak’s complex land situation, it was perceived that less than careful implementation of the process could result in the loss of many NCR claims while causing fierce internecine conflict.
The accusations against James gave a raw edge to the contest. Daniel was cast as the returning Dayak hero, a role in which he had revelled in the 1980s. James was portrayed as the villain who betrayed, or was at least callous towards Dayak interests. In the local parlance of Sarawak Dayak politics, James was cast as the next Jabu, referring to Alfred Jabu, a longstanding Deputy Chief Minister popularly portrayed as the paradigm of the subservient and obsequious Dayak. Branches and funding The situation was aggravated by the nature of the contest. The run-up to the 2000 TDC saw furious campaigning. With the opposing sides establishing new branches and needing financing, there was much talk about the sources of funds. Prominent in this contest was Sarawak businessman and one of PBDS’s financiers, Sng Chee Hua. Sng supported Daniel. Meanwhile, in a wink-and-nudge fashion, rhetorical questions were asked about the sources of James’ funds, the implication being that he was being funded by quarters opposed to Dayak interests; in less careful moments, it was openly suggested that he was being funded by the Chief Minister. As it turned out, Daniel handily triumphed and became Deputy President. Leo Moggie, the unchallenged incumbent president, exercised his prerogative and appointed James to the Supreme Council, as information chief. Yet this seeming show of unity and acceptance of the party’s will barely concealed the considerable bad blood that had been aroused. Following this TDC, Leo indicated his desire to step down as president, thus inadvertently opening up a conflict over succession. Despite the so-called March 2002 ‘Miri compromise’ – a proposal for Daniel as President and James as Deputy President – the bad blood spilt over in progressively ugly fashion. The party elite fractured into two opposing camps. In April 2003, PBDS Treasurer Joseph Salang, who was aligned with Daniel, reportedly offered to step aside in favour of James for the Deputy Presidency, but to no avail. In a curious twist, Sng, one of the elected party vice-presidents, switched sides and lined up with James to challenge not only Daniel, but apparently also founder-president Leo Moggie. This was vigorously denied by members of the James-Sng camp. Mentor-protege fallout After months of sandiwara, this was publicly acknowledged in September 2003 when Leo Moggie openly criticised James ‘as a paranoid who will go to any length in wanting to be the president’. Leo then firmly supported Daniel’s accession to the presidency. In response, James, likewise calling Leo ‘paranoid’, shot a broadside against the ineptitude of Leo’s leadership. Thus ended another Malaysian political mentor-protégé relationship. Leo had once expressed a preference for James, but by May 2002, Leo had changed his position in apparent deference to the sentiments of other party leaders when James teamed up with Sng to contest PBDS’s two top posts. Leo insisted that Dayaks should hold the two top posts – hardly something unexpected in light of the reasons for SNAP’s split back in 1983. It is unnecessary to delve excessively into the details of a conflict from which neither side has emerged with much credit, credibility or honour, although subsequent events appear to favour the hints thrown up by the Daniel faction that the conflict has been egged on from above. Briefly, Leo tried to settle the succession. First, he did not put himself up for re-election. Second, when that didn’t work, he resigned as President in June, thus handing over the reins of the party to Deputy President Daniel. Daniel promptly exercised the privilege of his position on the grounds that the terms of the Supreme Council’s 10 appointed members – seven of whom were aligned with the James-Sng camp – had lapsed with Leo’s resignation. The 10 members were apparently informed so by a fax signed by Leo. Daniel then re-appointed some of them, people widely seen to belong to his camp. He made new appointments, also of persons seen to be his supporters. Thus, the balance of support in the Supreme Council, which had been tilting towards the James-Sng faction following an earlier round of ‘hopping’, tilted back to the Tajem-Salang camp. Meanwhile, nine of the party’s 14 state assembly representatives and Members of Parliament – comprising six state assembly representatives (including all the state ministers) and three MPs – sided with James-Sng. Special branches Prior to this, there was intense jockeying at the branch level that reportedly resulted in a duplication of branches. The situation deteriorated to the point where branches supporting James’ faction were submitting their mandatory annual returns for the Secretary-General’s verification via James’ group – under lock-and-key or sealed in hardcover files, with the condition these could only be opened in the presence of one of their representatives. The locked and sealed returns were never opened. So it came to pass that the James-Sng camp was officially declared by the Credentials Committee not to have received any nominations for the 2003 TDC elections. At the official TDC in late July, those returns, still locked and sealed, were prominently exhibited on stage as evidence of the bad faith of the James-Sng camp. The Tajem-Salang slate was returned unopposed. The James-Sng camp lodged a report with the ROS, warning publicly that the party could be de-registered. They suggested new elections, according to their guidelines, as the only solution to the impasse. They staged their own TDC in Bintulu that unanimously returned their slate, unopposed, to head the party. The Tajem-Salang camp lodged a police report that the James-Sng camp had sent out notices that the real TDC had been moved to Bintulu. At the Bintulu so-called TDC in late July 2003, James obliquely referred to one of the undercurrents of the conflict when he noted that once a leader had placed his trust in a person, that person would be better positioned to persuade the leader to his views and his opinions. The implication was James had the Chief Minister’s trust. Indeed, in early July, at a Kapit gathering, James led a pledge of loyalty to the Chief Minister who in turn said he would only cooperate with those who could work with the BN – but then averred neutrality in PBDS’s conflict. At the official TDC in Santubong, also held in late July 2003, Leo declared the uncontested win by Daniel and his slate to be legitimate. He stated that many of the technical issues protested by the James-Sng camp in fact had been adopted on their suggestion. Daniel, in his speech, reiterated support for the Chief Minister, describing the latter as the guiding light for Sarawak’s rapid economic development, social integration and political stability. Subsequently, the Tajem-Salang group offered to accommodate the James-Sng group via appointments to the Supreme Council, but ruled out any fresh elections. The offer was rejected. The ROS Express From then on, events moved with exemplary rapidity – for the ROS which hasn’t yet approved the years-old registration applications of the Parti Sosialis Malaysia and took an inordinately long time to approve the merger of Parti Keadilan Nasional and Parti Rakyat Malaysia. The ROS’s investigations reportedly began in early August 2003. In late September, the ROS indicated a ruling would be some time in the making. The Deputy Home Affairs Minister reportedly expressed some confusion over the complaints. Yet, in early October, the ROS ruled the James-Sng TDC illegitimate and issued a ‘show cause’ letter to the PBDS executive. The letter raised doubts about the legitimacy of 29 branches represented at the TDC. The PBDS executive filed its response in early November. A month later, PBDS was deregistered. Meanwhile, the BN effectively suspended PBDS’s representation in the BN Council on the grounds of the party’s disputed leadership, even though there could be little doubt about the illegitimacy of the election of the James-Sng slate – whatever the rights and wrongs in the PBDS conflict. At the same time, at least BN Secretary-General Mohammad Rahmat made conflicting noises about the BN’s preparedness to accept a new splinter party into its fold even as the James-Sng camp initiated the formation and registration of a new party. Finally, following PBDS’s de-registration, Prime Minister Abdullah held out some hope by saying he wanted to save PBDS. His was a strange statement since, as Minister of Home Affairs, Abdullah has oversight over the ROS and had probably approved both the ‘show cause’ letter and the notice of de-registration. In October, moreover, at least one of the alleged underlying sources of conflict was made public when James praised Deputy Chief Minister Alfred Jabu of the PBB as an exemplary Iban leader, and called on all Dayaks to unite behind Jabu to make him the ‘Mahathir of the Dayaks’. Previously, much had been hinted. The James-Sng camp claimed to be close to the state BN leadership, while charging that their opponents were opposed to the leadership, or were not favoured by it. It is believed the Chief Minister continues to harbour considerable enmity towards Daniel as a result of the events of 1987 when PBDS was one of the leading partners in the attempt to unseat him. For their part, the Tajem-Salang side made statements about persons who were ineffective in championing Dayak interests, especially on land issues, for fear of losing their ministerial posts. Where are the people? It only adds to the opposing sides’ self-inflation to suggest that the people’s aspirations, purportedly represented by PBDS, have anything to do with this conflict. It has been quite a while since PBDS engaged the passions of the people. For some time now, the people have only served as the electoral vehicle for attaining the aspirations of an urban elite – for contracts, business opportunities and high positions. One can liken the conduct of this urban elite to that of the UMNO ‘Young Turks’ who powered the Bumiputera Economic Congresses, except the urban Dayak elite had neither the UMNO ‘Young Turks’ political adroitness nor political patronage. Dayaks in general, and Iban in particular, urgently face the real possibility of their becoming an urban and rural underclass. Still, too many of the Dayak elite are paralysed by an impotence compounded by self-interest. To be fair, there are some among the Dayak urban elite who are truly concerned with the fate of the Dayaks. Unfortunately, many of them remain trapped within the New Economic Policy box of ethnic preferences. Given the Dayaks’ political clout – or lack of clout, rather – the NEP box doesn’t contain much of a solution to the Dayaks’ myriad problems. Is this a harsh judgment? Just take one critical illustration. 
All independent observers, including Suhakam’s fact-finding mission and, it seems, federal officers, consider that a grave injustice was committed over the Bakun Resettlement.
On the Peninsula, FELDA, for all its faults, stands out as an example of a ‘land to the landless’ programme. For a minimal charge stretched over 25 years, each settler family is endowed with 10 acres of developed land. In Bakun, families once had tens of acres of land each plus access to a large area of forest and a rich river system. They were resettled with three acres of undeveloped land each. Six years after resettlement, virtually nothing has been implemented to ensure that they have a productive base and an income stream, even as they carry a debt of RM52,500 for their resettlement houses, while the government continues to withhold payment of compensation for their old housing. Meanwhile, their communities have begun to disintegrate. Where were the antagonists in the PBDS conflict while all this was happening? James Masing was chairman of the government’s Bakun Resettlement Committee. One of James’ supporters, Billy Abit, MP for Ulu Rejang, hails from a resettled community. One of James’ opponents, PBDS Secretary-General Stanley Ajang, State Assemblyman for Belaga, and one of the major concessionaires for the revived Bakun Dam, hails from another resettled community. There is surely some sadness at PBDS’ travails. However, there is little sense that it holds any great consequences for the day-to-day lives of the majority of Dayaks. This is the saddest aspect of this sorry state of affairs. Yet the more far-sighted BN politicians who might cheer a bit at seeing a minor irritant expunged know that if Dayaks are pushed into a corner – and some of them already feel that way – it will only be a matter of time before there is resurgent and strengthened Dayak opposition. The denouement? Might this then be part of the calculations in the apparent denouement being sought – to ensure the continued existence of a compliant Dayak elite, driven by its own narrow interests, leading a compliant Dayak party? In March 2004, on the eve of nominations for the parliamentary elections, Abdullah Badawi re-instated the PBDS subject to new party elections. This allowed the PBDS to contest the elections under the BN banner. Subsequent to the parliamentary elections, party elections were fixed for October, with the nominations vetting credentials committee under the chairmanship of a person appointed by the national BN. Various quarters meanwhile have suggested that a desirable outcome would be for James to become president with Joseph Salang as deputy president, thus side-lining Daniel Tajem. It appears that Putrajaya prefers such an outcome, although it is doubtful if it is tenable given both the acrimony of the past few years and the recent events during the parliamentary elections. The state BN, under the almost complete control of the Chief Minister, apparently prefers an unambiguous victory for the James Masing-Sng Chee Hua faction, and Putrajaya and the national BN might go along with this. There are two indications of this preference on the part of the Chief Minister. First is the total inaction, other than by the official PBDS leadership, against those who stood as and supported ‘independents’ against BN-approved PBDS candidates in the recent parliamentary elections. The official PBDS leadership issued ‘show cause’ letters to those who stood as ‘independents’ and who were known to have supported them, and subsequently sacked them. Amongst those thus sacked were Sng Chee Hua himself and a PBDS state assistant minister aligned to the James Masing-Sng faction. This faction protested the sackings, resulting in an apparent clarification from the national BN that the PBDS official leadership did not have the power to take such action. This is in stark contrast to the sacking of then state assistant minister Patau Rubis in 1995 for his part in supporting an ‘independent’ against a BN candidate for elections, as also the recent decision of UMNO to sack some members for doing the same. Second is the recent state cabinet reshuffle where the PBDS representatives appointed to the new cabinet were all aligned to the James Masing-Sng faction, with James himself promoted to Minister of Land Development. This included the son of Sng Chee Hua, who now holds the record of being the youngest person to be appointed to two assistant ministerial posts, in economic planning and industrial development (planning), barely three years since he was plucked from his undergraduate course at the London School of Economics to contest and win his first election to the state assembly in 2001. This is despite the recommendations of the official PBDS leadership and the availability of persons who have had longer tenure in the state assembly and are not inferior in capability. The message is loud and clear, and there can now be few doubts as to the behind-the-scenes role of the Chief Minister in the PBDS affair – at least of his preferences. The very public expression of those preferences will have an impact on the coming PBDS elections, given the patrimonial and patronage system of politics that prevails in Sarawak. Now e-mail us and tell us what you think. Your comments might be published in the Letters section of our print magazine, Aliran Monthly. Alternatively, post your comments to the message board. | |||||||||||||||
Yet the more far-sighted BN politicians who might cheer a bit at seeing a minor irritant expunged know that if Dayaks are pushed into a corner – and some of them already feel that way – it will only be a matter of time before there is resurgent and strengthened Dayak opposition.
